



CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

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CONSTITUTION AND TRANSFORMATION OF DIRECTORATE FOR SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (UBK) THROUGH ITS HISTORY

Abstract: Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Interior Affairs (MVR) Directorate for security and counterintelligence (UBK) is one of the key institutions in charge of security in Republic of Macedonia (RM). This is why it is of essential importance to understand the way in which this institution has operated from its constitution to present day. Explaining this will encompass all of its transformations as well as its practical works out in the field of operations. Focus is also placed on the UBK hierarchy and its operations directed towards the wellbeing of RM interior security. One of the most important reforms of UBK is the one that yet to come. What this means is creating and operating under a strategy which will make this institution much more transparent and approachable for the civilians. What is being suggested is that all operations of this Directorate become similar to those of the more modern western intelligence agencies who in a very transparent way publish their operations on their very own web sites. One possible way of implementing this form of UBK transformation is creating a subdivision of the existing MVR site. This subdivision website would post information pertaining to the operations of UBK and information of interest to the general population, all of which would be in accordance with the Law for classified information. The main goal of this effort is to make UBK's everyday efforts more efficient and more transparent. Having in mind everything state above it can be concluded that if in the future we want to achieve full synergy between several agencies and directorates whose jurisdictions intertwine and overlap (UBK, Intelligence Agency (AR), and Military service for security and intelligence (VSBiR)) then those institutions must put in a better team effort. This would mean greater exchange of obtained information with the goal of more efficiently conducting the tasks and responsibilities at stake.

Key words: Directorate for security and counterintelligence, transformation, improvement of operations, transparency.

1. Introduction

In accordance with the Law for interior affairs from 2014, in accordance with article 17, institutions operating as part of the MVR are: Bureau for public safety (BJB) and **UBK**, the latter of which will be topic of interest for this paper.

As part of their jurisdictions, the systems for state security undertake activities directed towards protection from espionage, terrorism, and all other activities that threaten to harm or take down democratically established institutions as prescribed by the RM constitution. Their activities are also directed towards protection from more severe forms of organized crime.

Directorate is ran by a director who independently runs the execution of the UBK affairs, and answers to the RM Minister of Interior Affairs, and the Government of RM, who in the first place awarded him a four year mandate.

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In line with suggestions made by the UBK director, the minister adopts acts for organizing and operating as well as the systematization of the job positions within the directorate. As part of performing their duties within their jurisdictions, employees of the Directorate have the right to gather data and information from citizens, institutions, companies, who are obligated to allow these directorate servants uninterrupted execution of their duties.

2. Establishing and development of UBK

On the 13th of May, 1944, in Drvar, former Yugoslavia, came with the forming of the Department for protection of the people (OZNA) as only security service. OZNA operational directions led to creation of intelligence and counterintelligence protection of the armed forces and institutions resulting out of the people led freedom fighting (1941 to 1945) and the later fights against the quisling Ballist troops and the terrorist gangs.

Soon after, individual OZNA departments were formed for each of the republics encompassing federal Yugoslavia. In Macedonia, OZNA was formed in July of 1944, in the village of Ramno, Kumanovo. On 31st of January of 1946 OZNA moved from jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, under jurisdiction of the Ministry of interior affairs. This led to reorganizing and creation of the Directorate for state security (UDBA). With its intelligence and counterintelligence activities UDBA protected the territory of Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRY), unmasks illegal operations and groups, faces remains of quisling and other gang formations, as well as more drastic forms of economic crime.

In 1966 came the forming of the cornerstones of the Service for state security (SDB) which worked on unmasking and deterring activities directed against state security and subverting or taking down the systems established by the Constitution.

After RM independence, SDB continues operating as part of this republic's Ministry of Interior Affairs, and works on fulfilling tasks predetermined by the Constitution and the Laws of RM.

In 1955, with reorganizing of its running bodies, SDB was renamed into The Board for security and counterintelligence (DBK), and in 2000, changes in the Law for organizing and running state administration led to DBK restructuring into Directorate for security and counterintelligence (UBK), which still continued performing tasks in connection with the system of state security. (www.mvr.gov.mk, 2016)

3. Intelligence – reconnaissance activities

In his book "National Security", Professor Mitko Kotovcevski from the University of Saint Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, states that intelligence – reconnaissance activities directed against our state are implemented under pre-established scenarios for the purpose of gathering much needed data about RM and its running institutions. Topics of key interest are the situations in areas of fundamental importance for the motherland – interethnic, cultural, military-police, economical, and political characteristics, while special interest is placed on the developments within the Army of Republic of Macedonia (ARM), and its interests for obtaining modern systems of armament. Intelligence – reconnaissance activities are conducted by outside and inside elements, combinations of these two, as well as intelligence services of certain states, representatives of which, could be infiltrated through foreign diplomatic embassies operating in our country, non-government organizations, humanitarian organizations, and even some structures of the United Nations (UN).

Representatives of the foreign military-intelligence agencies are above all focused on gathering data about the armed forces of RM, their structure, readiness and mobility of the units, or to summarize complete readiness of the entire defense system of RM. What is also of great importance for the intelligence actions are the operations of certain structures of paramilitary and secessionist forces. As part of certain political parties, at certain stages of development of the society, these extremist structures strive for secession and total disobedience for the state institutions. Their goal is to force functioning of parallel structures on a

certain territory of the state where they pose a majority. As part of final planning and implementing of possible terrorist actions and military activities of limited character, primary goal of the intel research of these structures is also ARM and MVR. (Kotovcevski, 2013:235)


4. Intelligence cycle according to CIA

According to Professor Kotovcevski (presented in the book “Intel Basics”) the intelligence cycle of obtaining information includes a certain portion of altering of data during their presentation as part of the final intelligence product which is being presented to the end customer. Intelligence cycle is a never-ending process due to the fact that ending one process means beginning of another. To begin with, the goal of the intelligence cycle is to permanently provide information which needs to reduce the amount of surprise the state and the nation may face. This minimizes the risk and helps create total overview in times of complex situations.

Resulting estimates of the final intelligence product do not represent the only way of predicting the future. They are just part of a trove of precisely analyzed conclusion about the most likely course of events which are of key importance for the security, future, functionality, and perseverance of any nation and state.


Estimates and knowledge gained from the intelligence process gives political actors great amount of information about future developments, which in its self is of vital importance for precise analysis of the current critical problems, and those of the future which is filled with traps, uncertainties and expectations. The basic stages of an intelligence cycle are presented in **picture 1**. (Kotovcevski, 2013: 60)

Figure 1: Basic phases of intelligence cycles



With different intelligence services - agencies this process varies, and the way this process is viewed by the United States (USA) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is presented in **picture 2**.

Figure 2: Intelligence cycle according to US CIA (Kotovcevski, 2013:62)




5. Organizational structure of Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Interior Affairs (October 2015)

Republic of Macedonia Directorate for security and counterintelligence (UBK) operates within the MVR. According to MVR hierarchy UBK is under direct control of the Minister of Interior Affairs, and as such answers directly to him and the Government of RM (article 25 of the Law for interior affairs).

With the goal of better visual presentation of the way the Macedonian Ministry of Interior Affairs operates as well as its organizational setup and the positioning of the UBK, what will follow will be a organogram of this ministry's hierarchy, which can be also found at this ministry's web page. (seefigure3)(Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Interior Affairs, 2015)

Figure 3: Organogram of the Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Interior Affairs



Institutions in charge of creating and implementing national security policy

(Republic of Macedonia Ministry of interior affairs, Directorate for security and counterintelligence as part of Republic of Macedonia security systems, 2016)

In the Republic of Macedonia, according to adopted laws and handed out jurisdictions, there are several institutions which share responsibility over the System for national security policy:

1. **Parliament of Republic of Macedonia** is in charge of adopting laws pertaining to the security and defense issues;
2. **President of Republic of Macedonia** is the supreme commander of the Macedonian security forces and is also President of the Republic of Macedonia Security Council;
3. **Government of Republic of Macedonia** proposes laws and other regulations from the sphere of security and defense and is in charge of their execution;
4. **Security Council**, discusses issues in connection with security and defense and offers the RM parliament and government draft proposals.

Picture 4 is a representation of the legal framework within which the security system must operate.

Figure 4: Legal framework within which the security system must operate.



Jurisdictions of Directorate for security and counterintelligence

Within the state security system UBK executes assignments pertaining to protection against:

- ✓ Espionage;
- ✓ Terrorism and other violent acts directed against democratic institutions established by the Constitution of Republic of Macedonia;
- ✓ Heavier forms of organized crime;

Espionage

Timely unveiling, stopping, and protection against:

- Activities by foreign intelligence services which may harm national security or economic stability of the state;
- Unauthorized access to classified information further use of which may threaten national interests and security of Republic of Macedonia;

Opposing terrorism and protecting constitutional establishment

Timely revealing and stopping of violent acts of political, religious, and/or ideological nature:

- Terrorism;
- Extremism;
- Protection of very important people (VIP);

Higher forms of organized crime

Coordinated and complex measures and activities coordinated with other state institutions with the goal of preventing and opposing all forms of organized crime.


Conventional crime – Smuggling of immigrants; Smuggling and illegal trading of weapons, drugs, people, archeological finds, falsifying of documents, foreign currency, and vehicles;

Economic-financial crime– Money laundering; (*Republic of Macedonia Ministry of interior affairs, Directorate for security and counterintelligence as part of Republic of Macedonia security systems, 2016*)

6. Organizational setup of UBK

Fifth figure shows clear representation of the organizational setup of UBK which de facto means opening of this institution before the citizens

Figure 5: Organizational setup of the Directorate for security and counterintelligence



(Republic of Macedonia Ministry of interior affairs, Directorate for security and counterintelligence as part of Republic of Macedonia security systems, 2016)

7. Jurisdictions and organizational units composing UBK

Department for security management, managing human resources and training conducts legal affairs, creates and conducts strategies and regulations regarding field operations, processes financial issues, manages human resources, as well as training in the field of security and counterintelligence.

Sector for international cooperation conducts activities in the field of international cooperation with the foreign security services both on bilateral and multilateral level, coordinates exchange of information which are in regards to safety and can lead to preventive actions, as well as conducting of protocol activities for the direct needs of the Directorate.

Sector for fight against international crime: based on guidance from the director this sector conducts coordination of activities of the operative part of the Directorate, all of which depending on the level of the security threat, and undertakes activities for conducting concrete plans.

Department for counterintelligence conducts and executes operative actions with the goal of countering actions by foreign intelligence services (their agents, centers) and conducts counterintelligence support and protection, with the goal of protecting classified information.

Department for protecting constitutional establishment and counterterrorism coordinates and executes operative actions with the goal of protection from all forms of threat against the constitutional establishment including all forms of terrorism and other violent means of action, conducts operative-preventive protection of VIP and sites as well as security checks of people for the needs of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and other state institutions.

Department for fight against more severe forms of organized crime coordinates and executes operative assignments for the purpose of preventing heavier forms of organized crime directed against the democratic institutions and constitutional establishment of Republic of Macedonia, and the security of in the state in general.

Department for analysis and research conducts identification of situations and developments which can pose a threat for the security of the state, and also analyzes the magnitude of the threat directed against the strategic and national interests.

Department for operative technology conducts operative-technical support of organizational units which the Directorate is composed of and which conduct security and counterintelligence activities for the purpose of protecting the constitutional establishment of the republic, protect VIP, fight heavier forms of organized crime. This department also works on maintaining the electronic and computer equipment used for the above mentioned purposes.

Department for antiterrorist protection executes operations directed at preventing and managing terrorist threats including preventive protection of sites and large gatherings, as well as antiterrorist checkups revealing and deactivating of explosive ordinances.

Department UBK-Skopje conducts operations in the field of counterintelligence, protection of constitutional establishment, countering terrorism and heavier forms of organized crime on the territory of the city of Skopje. This department also coordinates activities with the goal countering situations which can have security implications over the broader territory of Republic of Macedonia, thus bringing functional unity in fulfilling Directorate goals.

Regional operative sectors (ROS) Bitola, Veles, Gevgelija, Kumanovo, Ohrid, Prilep, Strumica, Tetovo, and Stip are in charge of affairs in the area of counterintelligence, protection of constitutional establishment, fight against terrorism and heavier forms of organized crime for the respective region in which they have been formed.

(Republic of Macedonia Ministry of interior affairs, Directorate for security and counterintelligence as part of Republic of Macedonia security systems, 2016)

7.1. Personnel in charge of operations

Deputy Directors, assistant directors, coordinative assistant directors, head of sector for international cooperation, head of sector for fight against international terrorism, all answer directly to the Director.

Heads of the regional operative sectors Bitola, Veles, Gevgelija, Kumanovo, Ohrid, Prilep, Strumica, Tetovo, and Stip answer to the Director and the coordinative assistant director.

When it comes to specific situations the heads of the regional operative sectors Bitola, Veles, Gevgelija, Kumanovo, Ohrid, Prilep, Strumica, Tetovo, and Stip also answer to the corresponding assistant director (counterintelligence and constitutional establishment, countering terrorism, or heavier forms of organized crime).


(Republic of Macedonia Ministry of interior affairs, Directorate for security and counterintelligence as part of Republic of Macedonia security systems, 2016)

7.2. Supervision of activities conducted by UBK

Supervision of UBK activities can be divided in three portions:

1. Government of Republic of Macedonia conducts supervision through the Ministry of Interior affairs, which within its self has a Sector for internal control that answers directly to the Minister of interior affairs;
2. Second filter is the Parliament of Republic of Macedonia, represented through two of its commissions: Commission for supervision of UBK and AR affairs, and Commission for supervision of intercepted communications;
3. Third, and the past decade, maybe the most important filter is the general public;

Figure 6: Supervision of UBK activities



(Republic of Macedonia Ministry of interior affairs, Directorate for security and counterintelligence as part of Republic of Macedonia security systems, 17.3.2016)

8. Institutions in charge of security issues: MVR-UBK, AR, VSBiR and J2. Current situation and suggestions that can lead to improvement

As part of the state security system of the state the founding of the intelligence and security community in Republic of Macedonia started with the adopting of the law for interior affairs in 1995. Back then the Service for state security which operated as part of MVR and was conducting intelligence and counterintelligence operations was split into two separate services.

This law led to the creation of the **Board for security and counterintelligence (DBK)**, which is now the **Directorate for security and counterintelligence (UBK)**, which remained operating within the MVR, and was awarded functions regarding internal security, while a special law, from that very same year, led to the creation of a separate stated institution called the **Intelligence agency (AR)**.

Intelligence agency conducts operations of foreign intelligence and is subordinate to the president of the state.

Law for defense also addresses issues of intelligence and counterintelligence nature. This led to the Ministry of Defense creating the Military service for security and intelligence (VSBiR) with jurisdictions of planning, organizing, and conducting intelligence, and counterintelligence for the purpose of protecting the forces of the Ministry of Defense and the ARM. Additionally, as part of the ARM, there is also the **J-2** section, which is subordinate to the VSBiR.

These three services (UBK, AR, VSBiR) compile the security-intelligence in Macedonia. Their founding mission needs to be team coordinated activities and exchange of information.

When talking about security-intelligence community we refer to a “community” and not a “system” or a “subsystem” of the state security system, because the basic problem we are facing is lack of

coordination in its efforts. In Republic of Macedonia there is no special body which would coordinate the security services, such as the case in Republic of Serbia and republic of Croatia.

Coordination of the security-intelligence community needs to be done within the crises management system, through the Evaluations Group, where heads of services would meet. Still in practice, this practice does not exist for multiple reasons.

In the past the basic problem was the “political gravity” that the former director of UBK had in comparison to the other heads and directors.

Second problem is the fact that the Evaluation group does not consist only of heads of these services, so they do not feel “comfortable” enough to exchange sensitive information.

Next problem is the fact that there is no in charge institution with jurisdiction to compile all the different reports of all the services into one document and as such presented before the in-charge institutions. Although the security-intelligence services are functionally dependent of one another, they are not connected between themselves either horizontally or vertically. It is true that they cooperate at an informal level but this is not enough and is the basic weakness of the way the system works right now.

There is also the problem with the Intelligence Agency (AR) which as a relatively new institution within the security-intelligence community has still not assumed its rightful position within the state security system. According to one survey-research results, this agency faces multiple problems.

The first problem comes due to the overlapping of certain jurisdictions between AR and UBK.

The second problem is the qualification of employees within the agency itself.

The third problem lies in the way this agency is positioned within the system. The main problem here is the fact that it is the President of the state that appoints the director of the agency, while systematization and financial portion of its operations is covered by the government.

In a situation like this, the government wants to limit AR dealings. This is especially so if the Premier and the President come from different political options. When we have such scenario the government reduces the funds that this agency gets. On the other hand because of the fact that the director is being appointed by the President of the state, there is a chance he might first get the information coming from the agency, and in return the UBK information might not be passed on to the president of the state at all.

When it comes to VSBiR there is the open issue of the parliament control over this service. Jurisdictions of the parliament commission for supervision of work of UBK and AR do not state that this commission can conduct parliamentary control over VSBiR, or that this service has an obligation to supply the parliament annual report regarding its affairs. Still this type of supervision can be implemented indirectly through the Commission for defense and security issues.

In the past, within the state security-intelligence community there was often “battle for prestige and rivalry” between the two civilian security-intelligence services. This had a negative impact over the quality of their work.

It seems that as an “older brother” UBK wants to deal more with intelligence activities and as such overstep into the jurisdictions of the AR. As a result of this, the intelligence service was inferior over the counter-intelligence one. This also reflected upon the quality of service of these services and their overall product.

This condition resulted in the primary users (president, premier, ministers of defense, interior affairs, and foreign affairs) getting diametrically different information about same event or situation, or with similar estimates, but in different periods of time.

All of this brings us to the conclusion that there is a need for a doption of a law which would define the cooperation and the jurisdictions between the different subjects within the state security and intelligence community. It is only then that the president, prime minister, and other in-charge state officials, will all have the same information about the situation in the state at the same time.

When it comes to the scandalous wiretapping incident which included following of communication of large number of officials in Macedonia, the report made by Pribe concludes that the tapping was done “illegally over the course of several years, and as such are not part of a law or judicial proceeding.”

This report also states that if taking in consideration the quality and magnitude of the made tapes, it can be concluded that they were made in the UBK offices. Content of many of the tapes indicates of illegal activities and misuse of power by many high-ranking government officials.

Internal and external supervision over the intelligence services suffer multiple flaws. These flaws are a result of the lack of activities by all supervision institutions. This in its self is a cause for major concern, states Pribe’s report. (*Nova Makedonija, Plusinfo2016*)

9. Conclusion

In the period to come the Directorate for security and counterintelligence (UBK) has a strategy according to which it plans to be more transparent and approachable towards the general population. UBK wants its course of action to be similar to that of CIA which very transparently publishes its operations on its website. In order to achieve this UBK supports opening of a sub-site at the MVR portal. This site would contain all UBK information which is not deemed as classified, thus making UBK more efficient and effective, while at the same time the general public would have a greater overview into its operations.

From everything stated up above it can be concluded that in the future, for the sake of more effective and efficient operating, UBK and the other security services (AR and VSBiR with J2) must work more as one team, because only this way will they improve their work results.

It also needs to be pointed out that in spite of all political turmoil in Republic of Macedonia, the UBK is successfully doing its job, especially when it comes to the fight against terrorism and the heavier forms of organized crime. This is due to the fact that UBK has professionals who are highly dedicated to performing their duties and maintaining the constitutional establishment of our state by opposing all forms of terrorism.

Latest example of this is the case with the migrant crisis in 2015, when about one million migrants transition through our state, some eighty of who participated in the battlegrounds in Syria and other hotspots in the Middle East. About six percent, or in total more than a thousand people from the Balkans participated in the war in Syria and have returned to their home countries, while several thousand (about three thousand) have returned to their home countries on the territory of the EU. In spite all of the risks our country faced, UBK and the rest of the security services managed to successfully deal with the migrant crisis. A lesson needs to be drawn from all of this and in the future period UBK and the rest of the security services need to vigilantly follow the situation due to announcements of future migrant crisis and the risks that may come to our country with this development.

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